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The tendency for some people to self-enhance when describ-
ing themselves remains a concern for researchers who rely on 
questionnaires and other self-report methods. Accurate iden-
tification of such individuals has been a longstanding goal of 
psychometricians, but the search for a valid indicator has been 
disappointing (for reviews, see Baer, Rinaldo, & Berry, in press; 
Paulhus, 1991, 2002). Few researchers completely ignore the 
issue, although many doubt the utility of currently available 
measures. The three approaches that have attracted the most 
attention as well as criticism are (a) social desirability scales, 
(b) intrapsychic measures, and (c) discrepancy measures.
Contemporary Measures of Self-Enhancement
Measures of Socially Desirable Responding
The most common approach has been to measure individual 
differences in socially desirable responding (SDR) via ques-
tionnaire. Such instruments pose questions designed to iden-
tify individuals who exaggerate their positive and minimize 
their negative qualities. Among the most popular are the Mar-
lowe-Crowne scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), the Edwards 
Social Desirability scale (A. L. Edwards, 1957), and the Bal-
anced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1984, 
1991). Although SDR scales are widely used, it is difficult to 
verify that these self-report instruments truly capture inflation 
of self-descriptions (Hogan & Nicholson, 1988; Paulhus, 2002). 
The key issue is the difficulty of distinguishing valid person-
ality content from desirable responding (Block, 1965; McCrae 
& Costa, 1983; Paulhus, 2002). For example, how do we know 
whether someone who denies ever swearing—a typical SDR 
item—is being honest or not?
Intrapsychic Measures
The tendency for people to rate themselves more positively 
than they rate others is known as the better than average effect 
(Alicke, 1985). Some researchers have inferred individual dif-
ferences in self-enhancement from the degree to which indi-
viduals exhibit the better than average effect. Brown (1986), 
for example, asked participants to compare themselves with 
the average other person across a variety of characteristics. 
The sum of such ratings was used to index an individual’s 
self-enhancement. As with SDR scales, this approach has 
been criticized on the grounds that no indicator of external 
reality is involved (Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; John & 
Robins, 1994).
Other intrapsychic measures include Krueger’s (1998) idio-
graphic technique based on the correlation between an indi-
vidual’s self-ascribed traits and his or her ratings of the desir-
ability of those traits. Its independence from other measures 
is intriguing (Sinha & Krueger, 1998) and warrants further re-
search. The most recent intrapsychic measure is the “supe-
riority index,” based on the difference between self-ratings 
and ratings of others (Bond, Kwan, & Li, 2000). These authors 
noted, however, that their difference score index is not ideal 
because it masks critical information about the two constitu-
ent components.
Criterion Discrepancy Measures
These measures index self-enhancement by the degree to 
which a respondent’s self-ratings are more positive than war-
ranted by a credible criterion (Funder & Colvin, 1997; Rob-
ins & John, 1997). Criterion measures fall into two categories: 
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Abstract
Overclaiming is a concrete operationalization of self-enhancement based on respondents’ ratings of their knowledge of various persons, 
events, products, and so on. Because 20% of the items are nonexistent, responses can be analyzed with signal detection formulas to in-
dex both response bias (over-claiming) and accuracy (knowledge). Study 1 demonstrated convergence of over-claiming with alternative 
measures of self-enhancement but independence from cognitive ability. In Studies 2–3, the validity of the overclaiming index held even 
when respondents were (a) warned about the foils or (b) asked to fake good. Study 3 also showed the utility of the over-claiming index 
for diagnosing faking. In Study 4, the over-claiming technique was applied to the debate over the adaptive value of positive illusions.
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operational criteria and social consensus. Operational criteria 
are unambiguous, concrete indicators of performance. For ex-
ample, intelligence test scores may be used as a criterion for 
self-rated intelligence (Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1998), grades as 
a criterion for scholastic ability ratings (Robins & Beer, 2001), 
and videotaped social behavior as a criterion for personality 
ratings (Gosling, John, Craik, & Robins, 1998). Social consen-
sus criteria rely on the assumption that the mean rating of a 
set of informed observers is the best estimate of social reality 
(e.g., Funder, 1995; Hofstee, 1994; Kenny, 1994; Kwan, John, 
Kenny, Bond, & Robins, in press). Given their face validity 
and logic of computation, criterion discrepancy measures ap-
pear to be the most convincing operationalization of self-en-
hancement to date.
Such measures are not without drawbacks, however. First, 
there are legitimate disputes about whether discrepancies 
should be measured with raw difference scores or the residual 
self-rating after the criterion is removed (Zumbo, 1999). Others 
have argued that neither procedure avoids the controversial 
problem of unreliability of difference scores (J. R. Edwards, 
1995). The practical difficulties of the discrepancy techniques 
are also a significant deterrent. The researcher has to collect 
two measures: a self-perception measure and an objective cri-
terion. Moreover, collection of the latter measure, whether it 
involves coding videotapes, administering ability tests, or es-
timating social consensus, is always a complicated and time-
consuming endeavor. An ideal approach would retain the ob-
jectivity of discrepancy measures yet permit assessment in a 
single self-report measure. The over-claiming technique is a 
promising candidate.
The Over-Claiming Technique
Over-claiming is the tendency to claim knowledge about non-
existent items. The term originated with Phillips and Clancy 
(1972), who developed an ad hoc index for use in a consumer 
survey. They asked respondents to rate their familiarity with 
a set of consumer-related items; in truth, none of the items ac-
tually existed. Hence, any claim of familiarity with the items 
suggested self-serving distortion. The sum of rated famil-
iarities with these nonexistent items constituted the index of 
over-claiming.
Surprisingly little use has been made of the over-claim-
ing approach suggested by Phillips and Clancy (1972). Sta-
novich and Cunningham (1992) asked respondents to rate 
their familiarity with a list of authors that included 50% 
foils to control for desirable responding. The claim rate for 
foils was subtracted from the claim rate for real authors to 
obtain an unbiased estimate of author knowledge. How-
ever, neither of these research teams analyzed the tendency 
to claim foils as a variable in its own right. The only such 
study was by Randall and Fernandes (1991), who used over-
claiming as a control for bias in self-reports of unethical be-
havior. Like Phillips and Clancy, they scored only nonexis-
tent items. Their over-claiming index (the sum of ratings of 
nonexistent items) showed significant positive correlations 
with SDR as measured by the Balanced Inventory of Desir-
able Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1991). This lone finding in 
the literature suggests that the over-claiming approach may 
have potential for indexing response biases in self-reports 
of personality.
The Over-Claiming Questionnaire (OCQ)
To systematize this approach, we developed a comprehen-
sive self-report measure of academic and everyday knowledge 
(Paulhus & Bruce, 1990). The items were culled from compre-
hensive lists provided by Hirsch (1988) in the appendix of his 
book, Cultural Literacy. We partitioned the items into 10 cate-
gories: historical names and events, fine arts, language, books 
and poems, authors and characters, social science and law, 
physical sciences, life sciences, popular culture, and current 
consumer products.
On that version of the questionnaire, titled the Over-Claim-
ing Questionnaire-150, or OCQ-150, respondents rate their fa-
miliarity with 150 items broken down into 10 categories. Each 
item is rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (never heard of 
it) to 6 (know it very well). One sample page from the ques-
tionnaire is presented in the Appendix. Within each category, 
3 out of every 15 items are foils, that is, they do not actually 
exist. Hence, any degree of claimed knowledge about them 
constitutes over-claiming. The three foils were created to ap-
pear to be plausible members of the same category as the 12 
real items. On the total of 150 items, then, a respondent could 
falsely claim knowledge of 30 foil items distributed over a va-
riety of topics.
Signal Detection Scoring
Given the nature of the OCQ response categories—claims 
to recognize existent and nonexistent items—signal detec-
tion analysis (SDA) seemed to be the ideal analytic approach 
(Swets, 1964). The approach applies when responses fall into 
one of four categories: (a) hits, claims that existent items are 
familiar; (b) false alarms, claims that nonexistent items are fa-
miliar; (c) misses, claims that existent items are unfamiliar; and 
(d) correct rejections, claims that nonexistent items are unfamil-
iar. From the signal detection perspective, previous research-
ers have used only false alarms to index over-claiming: That 
is, they tallied claims of only the nonexistent items. By using 
only false alarms, however, one discards useful information 
from the existent items. After all, respondents who over-claim 
should do so on existent as well as nonexistent items (i.e., they 
will assign a higher rating than is warranted). SDA, however, 
ensures that such information is not wasted. SDA exploits all 
responses in the calculation of separate indexes for accuracy 
and response bias.
Knowledge Accuracy
Accuracy is indexed by the number of hits relative to the num-
ber of false alarms. That construct has a variety of operational-
izations, the most well-known being d′ (Humphreys & Swets, 
1991). An accurate individual, then, is not the one scoring the 
most hits but the one showing the best ability to discriminate 
between existent and nonexistent items. When scored on the 
OCQ responses, we call this OCQ accuracy.
Response Bias
In SDA, response bias is the stylistic tendency to say “Yes, I rec-
ognize that item” versus “No, I don’t recognize that item.” 
This bias is assumed to influence ratings of both existent and 
nonexistent items. Numerous operationalizations of bias have 
been derived from SDA (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). Unfor-
tunately, the most popular index, beta, has statistical proper-
892 pau lh us e T al. i n Jou r na l of Pe r s on a l i t y a nd soc i a l Ps y c hol og y 84 (2003) 
ties that rule it out as useful for analyzing OCQ data (Paulhus 
& Petrusic, 2002).1 The raw false-alarm rate is an appealing 
choice because it provides the most face-valid operationaliza-
tion of over-claiming. Unfortunately, this index often correlates 
substantially with hit rate, thereby confounding the measure-
ment of over-claiming with accurate reports of knowledge.
Instead, we opted for criterion location (c) as our index of 
response bias. Index c is a standardized statistical estimate of 
how strong the sense of familiarity has to be for a respondent 
to say “Yes, I am familiar with that item” (Macmillan & Creel-
man, 1991).2 The values of c correspond roughly to the mean of 
the hit rate and the false-alarm rate. When scored on the OCQ 
responses, we call this index OCQ bias.
Summary
We used SDA to develop operationalizations of the concepts 
of over-claiming and knowledge on the basis of participants’ 
familiarity ratings on the OCQ. Specifically, over-claiming was 
operationalized with the OCQ bias index and general knowl-
edge with the OCQ accuracy index.
Preliminary Study
In a small preliminary study, the OCQ-150 was administered 
to a sample of 44 students (Paulhus & Bruce, 1990). Analyses 
revealed that (a) the OCQ accuracy index was correlated .48 
with scores on an IQ test and (b) the OCQ bias index was cor-
related .40 with self-perceptions of general knowledge. In ad-
dition, 8-week test-retest correlations of the accuracy index (r 
= .76, p < .01) and bias scores (r = .80, p < .01) revealed a rea-
sonable temporal stability.
When scored separately by knowledge domain, the 10 bias 
scores showed substantial intercorrelations (Paulhus & Bruce, 
1990). This consistency suggested to us that the same individ-
uals were over-claiming across all domains. We also found 
that reversing the direction of the rating scale of one domain 
had no effect on its intercorrelations with other domain scores: 
Hence, we ruled out the possibility that over-claiming was 
simply some sort of acquiescent response bias (e.g., Knowles 
& Condon, 1999; Wiggins, 1973).
Although the sample size was small (N = 44), these prelim-
inary results appeared promising enough to pursue the use of 
OCQ accuracy and OCQ bias as measures of knowledge and 
over-claiming. Our subsequent efforts yielded the four larger 
studies presented in this report.
Overview of Present Studies
In Study 1, we collected a variety of convergent validities for 
both the knowledge and over-claiming indexes. The over-
claiming index was also pitted against its strongest competitor, 
the criterion discrepancy measure. In Study 2, the robustness 
of the over-claiming index was evaluated across conditions 
where respondents were warned or not warned of the pres-
ence of foils. In Study 3, the robustness of the over-claiming 
index was evaluated under faking conditions. In Study 4, the 
utility of the over-claiming index was evaluated by testing 
its ability to provide leverage on the debate over the Taylor-
Brown positive illusions hypothesis.
Study 1. Convergent and Comparative Validity
We began by evaluating the respective convergent and discrim-
inant validities of the over-claiming index (OCQ bias) and the 
knowledge index (OCQ accuracy). The validity of the OCQ bias 
index would be supported by convergent correlations with al-
ternative measures of self-enhancement, including established 
trait measures. Specifically, OCQ bias should predict scores on 
the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Hall, 1979) and 
the Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE) scale (Paulhus, 1991). 
Similarly, OCQ accuracy scores should predict scores on a mea-
sure of crystallized intelligence (Horn & Cattell, 1966).
The design of Study 1 entailed the collection of question-
naire responses and mutual behavior ratings from members of 
30 small groups after a series of group meetings. Analysis of 
those self-report and peer ratings along with scores on a brief 
IQ test permitted the prediction of a variety of alternative mea-
sures of self-enhancement.
Method
Participants
Participants were 137 students, 60 male and 77 female, enrolled in 
a 3rd-year psychology course at a large Canadian university. Af-
ter the course was completed, they were asked if their data could 
be analyzed for research purposes. All agreed.
Instruments
Trait self-enhancement measures — The Narcissistic Personality 
Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979) is a well-validated measure 
of normal narcissism. The 40-item forced-choice version shows 
strong convergent validity with clinical judgment and self-en-
hancement behavior (e.g., Emmons, 1987; Raskin & Terry, 1988; 
Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995). Among its most robust behavioral cor-
relates is self-enhancement (e.g., John & Robins, 1994; Gosling et 
al., 1998; Paulhus, 1998). A sample narcissist option is “I would 
make a great leader”; a sample non-narcissist option is “I am just 
an average person.”
The BIDR (Paulhus, 1991; 2002) contains sixty 7-point Lik-
ert scales. Three subscales are scored as follows: (a) the SDE scale 
(20 items), designed to tap honestly held exaggeration of one’s 
positive attributes; (b) the Self-Deceptive Denial (SDD) scale (20 
items), designed to tap exaggerated tendencies to disavow one’s 
negative attributes; and (c) the Impression Management (IM) scale 
(20 items) designed to tap positive self-presentation targeted at a 
public audience. The intercorrelations of the SDE scale with the 
SDD and IM scales range from .20 to .35, whereas the latter two 
scales often show high intercorrelations (Paulhus, 2002). Only ex-
treme responses (i.e., 6 or 7, after rekeying) are scored. The ratio-
nale is that extreme responses are more likely to indicate distor-
tion (Paulhus, 1984).
Finally, the questionnaire package included the Self-Monitor-
ing scale (Snyder, 1974), a 25-item true-false measure designed to 
tap a propensity toward impression management. Recent reviews 
1 Paulhus and Petrusic (2002) provided details on this point. The standard formula for beta stipulates that bias scores approach neutral as d′ de-
creases. This quality is appropriate for certain applications of SDA but certainly not for individual differences. We require an index that yields 
meaningful values even for individuals with poor knowledge of a topic.
2 This interpretation required that c be reversed so that high scores indicate affirmative answers.
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are available in Graziano and Waschull (1995) and Gangestad and 
Snyder (2000).
Self and peer ratings — Participants rated all their group mem-
bers including themselves on twenty-five 15-point items. Five 
items related to cognitive ability (e.g., “intelligent,” “creative”). 
Fifteen bipolar adjectives derived from McCrae and Costa (1987) 
were used to tap the Big Five personality traits (i.e., three each). 
Five other peer-rating items addressed observed self-enhance-
ment, including “brags a lot” and “is egotistical.” Instructions 
warned that no ties were allowed: That is, no two members were 
to be assigned the same number on any one scale.
Cognitive ability — The Wonderlic IQ test (Wonderlic, 1977) was 
chosen to assess global cognitive ability. Included are items sam-
pled from verbal, quantitative, and analytic domains. Although a 
12-min time limit is imposed, the Wonderlic behaves more like a 
power test than a speeded test because the items are presented in 
ascending order of difficulty (McKelvie, 1989).
The measure is very popular in applied settings because of its 
ease of administration and comprehensive norms combined with 
ample reliability and validity evidence. Expert reviews have been 
favorable (e.g., Schmidt, 1985; Schoenfeldt, 1985). Test-retest re-
liabilities range from .82 to .94 (Wonderlic, 1992). Previous stud-
ies in college populations have demonstrated its predictive valid-
ity for college grades (McKelvie, 1989), self-ratings of intelligence 
(Paulhus et al., 1998), and supervisory rankings (Wonderlic, 1992).
Procedure
Prior to being assigned to groups, all participants completed a 
package of trait questionnaires. Next, participants were orga-
nized into 30 groups of strangers: 17 of the groups had 5 members 
and the remaining 13 groups had 4 members. Group assignments 
were random with the constraint of heterogeneity with regard to 
gender and ethnicity. The groups met weekly for 20 min over 7 
consecutive weeks. Participants were requested to avoid interac-
tion with fellow group members outside of official meetings. No 
instructions were given regarding leadership within the groups, 
but weekly instructions advised that each individual was to par-
ticipate in the discussion.
Before each meeting, a discussion topic was assigned. Top-
ics had been selected to encourage engagement with class read-
ings and lecture topics and to provide opportunity for a variety 
of personality dimensions to be brought into play. The topics, in 
chronological order, were descriptions of families’ or friends’ per-
sonalities, verbal and quantitative problem solving, positive and 
negative qualities of the self, worries and concerns, creative and 
absorbing experiences, social issues, and Allport’s characteristics 
of a well-adjusted person.
After the final meeting, participants were given a rating sheet in 
an envelope and were asked to return the completed sheet to the in-
structor sealed in an envelope at the next class session. The sheets 
asked the participant to rate the overall attributes of each member of 
the discussion group, including themselves, on a total of 25 items.
Results
As in all four studies presented here, gender differences, when 
found, were small and inconsistent. Therefore male and fe-
male participants were pooled in all of our analyses.
OCQ Indexes
The accuracy and bias indexes were calculated from the OCQ 
responses using standard signal detection formulas (Macmil-
lan & Creelman, 1991). Indexes were calculated at each of the 
six cutoffs on the 0–6 rating scale (i.e., 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). The 
hit rate was the proportion of the 120 real items on which the 
respondent gave a rating above the cutoff. Similarly, the false-
alarm rate was the corresponding proportion of the 30 foils on 
which the respondent gave a rating above the cutoff. The cut-
off was first set between ratings of 0 and 1, yielding an over-
all hit rate of .44 and a false-alarm rate of .25. From the hit and 
false-alarm proportions, two indexes were calculated for each 
respondent: The accuracy index was d′, and the bias index was 
the criterion location c.3 (For more detail on the choice of in-
dexes, see Paulhus & Petrusic, 2002.) These calculations were 
repeated for the other five cutoffs, and the six values of c were 
averaged to get the final value of OCQ bias for each partici-
pant. A similar procedure was followed to calculate OCQ ac-
curacy. The intercorrelation between OCQ accuracy and bias 
was .21.
Convergent Validities
Table 1 presents the associations of the OCQ accuracy and 
bias measures with a variety of relevant criterion measures. 
In each case, the criterion was regressed simultaneously on 
both accuracy and bias. The OCQ accuracy index shows a 
significant association (here, a standardized regression coeffi-
cient) with its criterion—scores on the IQ test. The OCQ bias 
index also shows significant associations with its two crite-
rion measures—the NPI and the SDE—but not with the IM, 
SDD, or Self-Monitoring scales. 
Other Criterion Measures
The rating index for cognitive ability (five items) yielded alpha 
values of .73 for self ratings and .84 for peer ratings. The rat-
ing index for observed self-enhancement (five items) yielded 
an alpha of .72.
We then constructed two discrepancy measures of self-
enhancement. The first was ability enhancement: the discrep-
ancy between self-reports of intelligence and scores on a 
standard IQ test. The discrepancy score was calculated as the 
residual of the self-rating index after IQ was removed with 
regression.
The second discrepancy measure was personality enhance-
ment. First, self-enhancement was calculated on three-item 
composites of each of the Big Five factors. For each factor, a 
discrepancy score was calculated as the residual of the self-rat-
ing composite after the corresponding observer-rating com-
posite was removed via regression. Two factors were extracted 
from the intercorrelations among these five discrepancy mea-
sures. As in previous work, Factor 1 was dominated by Extra-
version and Openness and Factor 2 was dominated by Agree-
ableness. On the basis of similar results in Paulhus and John 
(1998), the first factor was interpreted as egoistic bias. This 
narcissistic form of self-enhancement is the central concern in 
the present report. Therefore, this first-factor score was used 
as our measure of personality enhancement.
Results are displayed in the final two rows of Table 1. As 
predicted, OCQ bias shows significant associations with both 
discrepancy measures of self-enhancement in performance, 
but OCQ accuracy does not.
3 Recall that responses were made on a 7-point scale, thus providing six cutoff values. The calculations of hits and false alarms culminating in d′ 
and c were repeated for the other five cutoffs. The final values of each index were the means across the six possible cutoffs.
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Head-to-Head Comparison
The performance of these two discrepancy measures was 
then compared with that of OCQ bias with respect to their 
ability to predict various criterion measures of self-enhance-
ment, including the NPI and SDE. The results are presented 
in Table 2. 
Note that the validities of the OCQ bias measure are all 
higher than the corresponding validities for either discrepancy 
measure. In no case are the differences statistically significant, 
but it is evident that the OCQ bias index performs at least as 
well as either discrepancy measure.
Discussion
Study 1 has confirmed the dual function of over-claim-
ing analysis. The accuracy and bias indexes scored from the 
OCQ knowledge ratings appear to be valid operationaliza-
tions of cognitive ability and self-enhancement, respectively. 
In particular, the convergent validities of both indexes—al-
ready promising in the preliminary study (Paulhus & Bruce, 
1990)—were confirmed in a large sample. The OCQ accu-
racy index showed a substantial association with an estab-
lished measure of cognitive ability. Thus, the ability to distin-
guish real items from foils on the OCQ is indicative of a more 
general cognitive ability (for further evidence, see Paulhus & 
Harms, in press).
More important for this report is the convergence of the 
OCQ bias index with a variety of established measures of 
self-enhancement. First, the OCQ bias index, but not the ac-
curacy index, showed significant prediction of two self-en-
hancing traits, namely, narcissism and self-deceptive en-
hancement. In addition, the bias index converged with two 
sets of self-criterion discrepancy scores: One set comprised 
discrepancies between self and peer ratings of personality 
from discussion group members; the second set comprised 
discrepancies between self-rated intelligence and IQ scores. 
Together, the evidence justifies our argument that the OCQ 
bias measures a form of self-enhancement appropriately la-
beled over-claiming.
When the over-claiming and discrepancy measures were 
compared head-to-head in predicting various self-enhance-
ment criteria, the over-claiming index performed at least as 
well. Of special interest is the fact that both were able to pre-
dict observer ratings of self-enhancement: Self-enhancing ten-
dencies do not go unnoticed in discussion groups.
Study 2. Effects of Warning Participants About Foils
Study 1 confirmed the ability of the over-claiming index to 
predict trait measures of self-enhancement. But would this ca-
pability be undermined if participants were warned that the 
OCQ contains foils, that is, nonexistent items? Increasing ac-
countability has been shown to decrease self-enhancement 
(Lerner & Tetlock, 1999 4; Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 
2002). At the same time, accountability does not appear to 
change the relative tendency of narcissists to self-enhance to a 
greater degree than do non-narcissists (Robins & John, 1997). 
Study 2 addresses both issues by directly manipulating narcis-
sists’ and non-narcissists’ awareness of the presence of foils. 
We predict that (a) accountability will produce an overall re-
duction in over-claiming and (b) narcissists will continue to 
over-claim more than do non-narcissists.
Method
Participants
A total of 239 students (83 men and 156 women) participated for 
bonus marks in an undergraduate psychology course.
Procedure
The NPI and a 90-item version of the OCQ were administered to 
several large classes. The NPI was administered in standard ques-
tionnaire format. A cover sheet was distributed with spaces for 
demographic information and brief instructions about how to rate 
familiarity of the OCQ items. To keep all participants responding 
at the same pace, the OCQ items were presented one at a time on 
an overhead projector and simultaneously read aloud.
Table 2. Study 1: Comparative Predictive Efficacy of Over-Claiming 
Questionnaire (OCQ) Bias Index (Over-Claiming) Versus Two Dis-
crepancy Measures of Self-Enhancement
                                                                            Discrepancy measures
                                         Over-claiming
                                               measure            Intelligence          Personality
Criterion or outcome           (OCQ bias)        enhancement        
enhancement
Narcissism (NPI)  .35**  .31**  .17*
Self-Deceptive
    Enhancement (SDE)  .30**  .26**  .17*
Observed
    self-enhancement .35**  .30**  .26**
N = 137. All values are beta regression coefficients. NPI = Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory.
* p < .05 ;  ** p < .01
Table 1. Study 1: Associations of the Two Over-Claiming Ques-
tionnaire (OCQ) Indexes With Criterion Measures of Ability and 
Self-Enhancement
                                                                                      OCQ signal
                                                                                    detection indexes
Measure                                                                   Accuracy            Bias
Cognitive ability (IQ test)  .52**  .17*
Narcissism (NPI)  –.15  .35**
Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE)  .11  .30**
Self-Deceptive Denial (SDD)  –.15  –.14
Impression Management (IM)  –.15  –.15
Self-Monitoring Scale (SMS)  .14  .11
Discrepancy measures based on
          discussion-group ratings
   Ability enhancement  .13  .25**
   Personality enhancement  .03  .22**
N = 137. All values are the beta coefficients obtained when both bias 
and accuracy are entered in regression equations. NPI = Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory.
* p < .05 ;   ** p <  .01
4 A few exceptions are noted by Lerner and Tetlock (1999).
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The warning manipulation was effected by randomly varying 
the instruction statement appearing in bold at the bottom of the 
cover page. Participants in the warned condition were advised: 
“Note that some of the items in this inventory do not exist.” Partic-
ipants in the unwarned condition were advised: “Note that some 
of the items in this inventory are very difficult.”
After completing all 90 items, participants were asked to turn 
over their answer booklet. All participants were then informed 
that some items did not exist and were asked if they recalled re-
ceiving the warning about the presence of nonexistent foils. With-
out turning over the sheet to check, they were asked to indicate on 
the back of the answer booklet whether they recalled seeing the 
warning.
Results
In the warned condition, only the participants who noticed the 
warning were included in the analyses. The intercorrelations 
of the OCQ accuracy and bias indexes did not differ between 
the warned condition (r = .24) and the unwarned condition (r 
= .19).
To maximize statistical power, the effect of narcissism level 
and warning condition were analyzed with regression rather 
than an analysis of variance (ANOVA). OCQ bias scores were 
regressed on NPI scores and the categorical variable repre-
senting experimental condition (warned = 1, unwarned = 0). 
An interaction term was created by multiplying the two pre-
dictors. The two main effects were force entered before the in-
teraction term was entered as a predictor.
Narcissism showed a significant main effect (β = .26), t(237) 
= 3.00, p < .01. Specifically, narcissists over-claimed more 
than did non-narcissists. The main effect for condition was 
also significant (β = .19), t(237) = 2.19, p < .05. Warned partic-
ipants showed lower bias scores than unwarned participants. 
The interaction was not significant, suggesting that narcis-
sists reduced their over-claiming no more and no less than did 
non-narcissists.
We also analyzed answers to the incidental question about 
whether participants had noticed the warning about foils. As 
above, OCQ bias was regressed on narcissism scores and con-
dition. Not surprisingly, participants who were warned sub-
sequently reported seeing the warning significantly more 
than did those who were unwarned (β = .26), t(237) = 3.71 p < 
.001. This result provides a check for the warning manipula-
tion. Narcissism also showed a significant main effect (β = .19), 
t(237) = 2.25, p = .05, with high narcissists claiming to have 
seen the warning more than did low narcissists. The interac-
tion was not significant. The lack of interaction implies that 
narcissists claimed to have seen a warning whether or not they 
actually received it.
Discussion
Does warning participants about the foils have any effect on 
over-claiming? Study 2 suggests two effects. First is a reduced 
rate of over-claiming: Participants showed a more modest 
self-presentation when the possible embarrassment of claim-
ing a nonexistent item was made salient. This malleability of 
self-enhancement is consistent with recent work using other 
operationalizations of self-enhancement (Alicke, Klotz, Bre-
itenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Krueger, 1998). In par-
ticular, the finding supports recent arguments that account-
ability deters self-enhancement (Sedikides et al., 2002).
Second, and more important for our primary message, the 
validity of the over-claiming index as a measure of self-en-
hancement was not compromised by the warning. Narcissists 
continued to over-claim more than did non-narcissists—and 
to the same degree. Apparently, the deterrent effects of ac-
countability operate independently of the effects of trait levels 
of self-enhancement.
Study 3. Effects of Deliberate Self-Presentation
Study 1 established that the over-claiming index aligns with 
trait bias measures in student surveys, but such surveys tend 
to be low-demand conditions where participants’ responses 
are largely forthright (Paulhus, 1991; Piedmont, McCrae, Rei-
mann, & Angleitner, 2000). Nonetheless, Study 2 showed that 
the threat of accountability reduces over-claiming. But will 
over-claiming increase when participants attempt a positive 
self-presentation? In Study 3, we manipulated self-presenta-
tion by administering the OCQ under two instructional sets: 
“respond honestly” and “make a good impression.” Such in-
structions have been shown to be effective in altering the level 
of desirable responding in a systematic fashion (e.g., Holden, 
Wood, & Tomashewski, 2001; Paulhus, Bruce, & Trapnell, 
1995; Wiggins, 1959).
Predicting the effects on individual differences is more 
complex. First, one must distinguish two aspects of positive 
self-presentation, namely, positive impression management 
and self-deceptive enhancement (e.g., Paulhus, 1984; Paulhus 
& Reid, 1991). Using impression management, people often 
exaggerate their positive qualities in a conscious, deliberate 
fashion (for reviews, see Leary, 1995, or Schlenker & Weigold, 
1989). Under self-deception, people actually believe these ex-
aggerations. Under low-demand conditions, narcissistic self-
enhancement is self-deceptive (Paulhus, 1998). The results of 
Study 2 suggest, however, that narcissists are as susceptible as 
non-narcissists to situational demands.
Accordingly, we hypothesized two effects in these data. 
First, we expected that the mean over-claiming scores would 
track the demand for self-presentation across context. Second, 
we expected that the over-claiming rate of narcissists would 
remain higher than that of non-narcissists—even in the good 
impression condition. In other words, the validity of the over-
claiming index should be sustained across conditions.
Method
Participants
A total of 76 undergraduate students participated as a class exer-
cise in a 2nd-year undergraduate social personality class.
Materials and Procedure
In a within-subjects design, three instruments were adminis-
tered under both honesty and good impression instructions. For 
this purpose, preliminary work was necessary to develop parallel 
forms of the three instruments. Two 30-item versions of the OCQ 
were developed by sampling items across four domains (litera-
ture, science, art, and history). Otherwise, the format was identi-
cal to the OCQ in Studies 1 and 2. The NPI was divided into two 
20-item versions. As in Study 1, it followed the standard forced-
choice format.
To index self-presentation, two parallel 14-item self-report 
measures were developed. They were designed to cover a broad 
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range of personality and intellect: Therefore, each version was as-
signed two items for each factor of the Big Five Inventory (John & 
Srivastava, 1999) and four cognitive ability items. The items were 
matched for desirability across versions. The rating scales ran 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). As a composite, the 14 items 
were labeled Positive Personality.
The administration procedure was presented as a class exercise 
in faking questionnaires. Participants were told that the responses 
would be totally anonymous. The two versions of each instrument 
were administered back to back. Preliminary instructions were 
forthright that participants were to respond honestly to the first 
version of each measure and to present an impression that was 
“as positive as possible” on the second version. Honest responses 
to the first version were encouraged by noting that, without re-
sponding honestly, subsequent scoring and feedback on their re-
sponses would be pointless. We chose this order because previous 
work indicated that faking first undermines the validity of subse-
quent honest responses (Holden, 1997).
Items were presented one by one on an overhead projector. 
The order of presentation was (a) the two 14-item personality-abil-
ity items, (b), the two 20-item versions of the NPI, and (c) the two 
30-item versions of the OCQ. All participants were specifically 
warned about the presence of foils on the OCQ.
Results
All instruments were scored such that high numbers repre-
sent a positive impression. The alpha reliabilities for the two 
conditions were reasonable for all variables: Positive Person-
ality (.76, .72), NPI (.74, .80), and OCQ bias (.78, .90). It may 
be surprising that the alphas were so high in the faking con-
dition, because one would expect a severe restriction of range 
at the positive end of each measure. The size of these alphas 
suggests that participants used different but consistent fak-
ing styles: Some stuck with the most positive option whereas 
others selected a less-than-perfect option—perhaps to indicate 
that the best personality is not the most extreme.
The mean scores for each version of the three instruments 
were compared across honesty and faking conditions. All three 
measures showed significant increases in positivity. The 14-item 
Positive Personality index operated successfully as a manipu-
lation check to confirm that participants had followed instruc-
tions, t(74) = 22.4, p < .01. Our primary concern, the OCQ bias 
index, was significantly higher in the good impression condition 
than in the honest condition, t(74) = 4.5, p < .01. This result sup-
ports our first hypothesis.5 The intercorrelation of the accuracy 
and bias indexes did not differ significantly between the honest 
condition (r = .15) and the good impression condition (r = .24).
Narcissism was measured by the 20 responses to the NPI 
items in the honest condition. These scores were used to pre-
dict OCQ bias scores in both the honest condition (r = .21, p < 
.05) and good impression condition (r = .17, p < .05). To test 
whether these associations were different, we evaluated the in-
teraction between condition and level of narcissism. A median 
split on the NPI was used to separate low from high narcis-
sists. In a mixed ANOVA, OCQ bias scores in the two condi-
tions were used as the within-subjects factor and the NPI cate-
gorization as the between-subjects factor.
The main effect for condition was significant, F(1, 74) = 
23.87, p < .01, indicating that over-claiming was higher in the 
fake good condition. Also significant was the main effect for 
narcissism, F(1, 74) = 5.61, p < .05, indicating that narcissists 
over-claim more than non-narcissists. There was no sign of an 
interaction, F(1, 73) = 1.73, p = .22, supporting our prediction 
that the NPI validity should be sustained across conditions.
Although significant, these validities—that is, the associa-
tions between OCQ bias and NPI—do not appear impressive. 
Some readers may recognize the statistical factor that works 
against the significance of our predictions in this study: Spe-
cifically, the standard NPI and OCQ measures were shortened 
for use in the repeated-measures design. Thus, all the mea-
sures are systematically less reliable than the version typically 
administered (see Gulliksen, 1967). When corrected for the fact 
that the NPI was one half and the OCQ was one fifth its usual 
size, the correlations between the NPI and the OCQ bias index 
rise from .21 (honest condition) and .17 (good impression con-
dition) to .34 (honest condition) and .29 (good impression con-
dition). As effect sizes (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, p. 444), the 
latter values are in the moderate range.
Discussion
OCQ bias, our over-claiming index, appears to be sensitive to 
both trait and situational sources of self-enhancement. When 
trying to give a positive impression, participants showed a 
substantially higher rate of overclaiming.6 Even though all 
participants had been warned of the presence of foils, partic-
ipants motivated to impress showed a clear tendency to exag-
gerate their claims of familiarity. This main effect suggests that 
the over-claiming scores can be useful in diagnosing demand 
for self-presentation across conditions.
At the same time, individual differences continue to play a 
role in predicting over-claiming. Within each condition, nar-
cissists over-claimed more than did non-narcissists. Hence, 
the over-claiming index remains a valid indicator of trait self-
enhancement regardless of the potentially disruptive impact 
of demand for self-presentation. Moreover, responses were 
anonymous in both conditions. One interpretation is that 
the narcissist’s interpretation of self-enhancement instruc-
tions is to claim even more knowledge, whereas the non-nar-
cissist’s interpretation is that self-enhancement entails some 
modesty.
Study 4. Application to the Positive Illusions Debate
Taylor and Brown (1988) triggered an extended debate by pos-
tulating that positive illusions are adaptive. Among their three 
categories of illusions was that of overly positive self-perceptions, 
that is, an exaggerated belief that one possesses positive char-
acteristics. Most of the subsequent literature, including our 
Study 4, has dealt with that type of illusion.
The empirical basis for the Taylor-Brown postulate included 
demonstrations of the adaptive correlates of intrapsychic mea-
sures of self-enhancement. For example, Brown (1986) showed 
5 Note that the OCQ was the only one of the three measures where participants were warned about possible detection of their faking (by mention-
ing the foils).
6 One criticism of this main effect for condition derives from the fixed order of honest then good impression. Recent work has shown that a repeat ad-
ministration induces more desirable responses (Knowles, Coker, Scott, Cook, & Neville, 1996). The effect size from those studies (roughly .15), how-
ever, is so small in comparison to ours (roughly .80 for our Positive Personality index), that a repetition order effect cannot explain our results.
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that susceptibility to the better-than-average effect predicted 
high self-esteem scores. A number of subsequent studies us-
ing discrepancy measures of self-enhancement, however, re-
vealed maladaptive outcomes for self-enhancers (Colvin et al., 
1995; John & Robins, 1994). Still others have shown that that 
the valence and strength of association depends on the type 
of outcome measure as well as the type of self-enhancement 
measure (Bonanno, Field, Kovacevic, & Kaltman, 2002; Paul-
hus, 1998; Roberts & Robins, 2000; Robins & Beer, 2001).
In Study 4, we evaluated the Taylor-Brown proposition us-
ing over-claiming as our operationalization of self-enhance-
ment. A large sample of undergraduate students completed 
the OCQ along with several self-report measures of self-en-
hancement and adjustment. Adjustment ratings by knowl-
edgeable informants were also collected.
To the extent that Taylor and Brown (1988) were correct, 
over-claiming should show a positive association with adjust-
ment. To the extent that critics were correct (e.g., Colvin et al., 
1995; John & Robins, 1994), over-claiming should show a nega-
tive association with adjustment.
Method
Subjects and Procedure
Complete data were collected from 157 undergraduate students at 
a large Canadian university. The sample included 55 men and 102 
women enrolled in an introductory psychology course. All partici-
pated for extra course credit.
Participants were assessed with regard to three sources of in-
formation. First, they completed a self-report inventory in a group 
administration. The inventory included (a) two standard ques-
tionnaire measures of adjustment, namely Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-
Esteem Scale and Block’s (1989) revised Ego-Resiliency Scale, and 
(b) two standard measures of response bias, namely, the BIDR and 
the NPI. For descriptions of the latter two instruments, see Study 
1, above. The inventory also included self-ratings of cognitive abil-
ity and adjustment.
The second source of information was a take-home package 
that included the OCQ. Participants were asked to complete the 
package privately and return it to class for experimental credits. 
Instructions on the OCQ cover page advised participants to avoid 
asking anyone or looking up the items before they rated how fa-
miliar they looked: “We are simply doing a survey of what things 
students are familiar with and what things look unfamiliar.”
The third source of information was a set of ratings completed 
by two knowledgeable informants. For a second extra credit, par-
ticipants had to find two individuals who knew them well enough 
to complete the rating form privately and mail it back directly to 
the researchers. Roughly 52% were friends, 40% were relatives, 
and 8% were others. Informants had to include their telephone 
numbers to permit verification that they had completed the rat-
ings without any undue influence from the participant.
Instruments
Self-report adjustment —Three self-report measures were used. 
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale is the most widely used measure 
of personal adjustment (Rosenberg, 1965). The concept emphasizes 
global self-worth as typified by such items as “On the whole, I am 
satisfied with myself.” The alpha reliability was .92 in this sam-
ple. The revised Ego-Resiliency Scale (Block, 1989) was designed 
to measure resourceful adaptation to everyday stressors. Sam-
ple items are “I enjoy dealing with new and unusual situations” 
and “I get over anger reasonably easily.” The construct validity of 
the instrument was supported in a review by Block and Kremen 
(1996). The alpha reliability was .80 in our sample. Finally, adjust-
ment was also indexed by a composite of six self-report items with 
an alpha value of .70.
Informant-rated adjustment —Parallel with the self-report com-
posite, adjustment was also scored from six items rated by in-
formed observers. The items included “is well-adjusted” and “is 
often upset” (reverse scored). The alpha reliability of the six items 
was .86 in this sample.
Trait self-enhancement measures —The NPI, described above un-
der Study 1, had an alpha reliability of .85 in this sample. The SDE 
and IM scales, also described under Study 1, had alpha reliabili-
ties of .70 and .65, respectively.
Discrepancy self-enhancement measure —The composite of five 
items measuring cognitive ability showed alphas of .78 for the 
self-report and .81 for the observer reports. A discrepancy mea-
sure was created from the composites of the self-report and infor-
mant-rated cognitive ability. The self-report was regressed on the 
informant report and the residual was isolated for use as a mea-
sure of ability self-enhancement.
Results
The three trait self-enhancement measures were regressed one 
at a time on the OCQ accuracy and bias indexes. As before, 
none of the three trait measures showed significant associa-
tions with the accuracy index. For all three, however, the con-
vergent associations of the OCQ bias index were significant: 
Betas were .19, .24, and .23 for the NPI, the SDE scale, and the 
discrepancy measure, respectively (ps < .01). This pattern rep-
licates once more the validities established in Studies 1–3, as 
does the nonsignificant association (−.06) with the IM scale. 
Note that this discrepancy measure differs from that used in 
Study 1 in that the criterion for ability was informant ratings 
rather than an IQ test.
The adjustment results are reported in Table 3. The entries 
in the table are the regression coefficients of the OCQ bias in-
dex (over-claiming) when used along with the OCQ accu-
racy index in predicting adjustment. On the basis of the Tay-
lor and Brown (1988) hypothesis, we used one-tailed tests to 
evaluate the predictions. Values in the first data row indicate 
that over-claiming has moderate-sized associations with self-
report adjustment (first three data columns) but a nonsignif-
icant association with informant-rated adjustment (fourth 
data column). Values in the second and third data rows indi-
cate that the self-report associations remain significant even 
with NPI and SDE added as predictors. These last two steps 
are equivalent to partialing out the effects of narcissistic bias 
on adjustment. 
Discussion
The results of Study 4 provide another replication of the basic 
validity results for the OCQ bias, our index of over-claiming. 
Once again, the tendency to over-claim shows significant asso-
ciations with questionnaire indicators of personalities known 
for their propensity to self-enhance, namely, narcissists and 
self-deceptive enhancers.
The unique contribution of this study is toward the debate 
over the Taylor-Brown adjustment hypothesis. The relation be-
tween adjustment and over-claiming (our operationalization 
of self-enhancement) depended on how adjustment was mea-
sured. When evaluated by knowledgeable informants, psy-
chological adjustment showed minimal association with over-
claiming. To the extent that adjustment can be assessed by the 
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brief measure completed by our informants, the results indi-
cate that well-adjusted individuals have no particular propen-
sity for self-enhancement.
When adjustment is measured by self-report, the link with 
positive illusions reemerges. Over-claiming showed signifi-
cant positive associations with two standard self-report mea-
sures of adjustment, namely, Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale 
and Block’s Ego-Resiliency Scale. Are self-reports of adjust-
ment credible without support from informant reports? Some 
writers argue yes (e.g., Brown, Dutton, & Cook, 2001; Taylor & 
Armor, 1996): A positive self-view can be seen as an inherent 
part of good adjustment.
In this more limited respect, then, our self-report data 
do support the Taylor-Brown hypothesis. At the same time, 
the introduction of narcissism into the regression equa-
tions showed a clear reduction in these supportive associa-
tions. This reduction supports the claim that self-report ad-
justment measures contain a component of narcissistic bias 
(Block & Thomas, 1955; Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 
2002; Paulhus, 1998). Some have described this distinction 
as genuine self-esteem versus defensive self-esteem (Raskin, 
Novacek, & Hogan, 1991; Trzesniewski, Donellan, Robins, 
& Paulhus, 2003).
However, if over-claiming is a manifestation of narcissism, 
it seems surprising that adding narcissism as a predictor failed 
to eliminate the relation between adjustment and bias. The lat-
ter association remained significant after partialing out nar-
cissism. Apparently, individuals scoring high on self-report 
measures of adjustment show an independent boost in self-en-
hancement above and beyond that attributable to narcissism. 
This bias associated with “genuine self-esteem” may repre-
sent the overgeneralized cognitive confidence of successful 
individuals.
To readers who consider ratings by informed observers—
friends and family—to be the most credible measure of ad-
justment used in these studies, our results show minimal rela-
tion between self-enhancement bias and adjustment. Although 
self-enhancers may be interpersonally offensive (Colvin et al., 
1995; John & Robins, 1994; Paulhus, 1998), they are viewed by 
others as no better or worse adjusted than average. Other read-
ers might argue that neither self-ratings nor informant ratings 
will suffice: Clinical expert judges are necessary.
General Discussion
Most observers agree that people can, and often do, exagger-
ate the positivity of their self-reports. There is also a growing 
consensus that when people self-enhance, they sometimes do 
so in a self-deceptive fashion and sometimes as a conscious 
strategy. There is little consensus, however, that a valid mea-
sure of self-enhancement is currently available. Various so-
cial desirability scales, intrapsychic measures, and discrepancy 
measures have all been subject to severe criticism. Much of the 
criticism stems from the fear that self-report self-enhancement 
measures, though practical, are actually measures of genuinely 
positive attributes. Critics have called for a concrete, objec-
tively scored indicator of self-enhancement. In this article, we 
offer the over-claiming technique as an advance in this search 
for a practical yet objective measure.
The over-claiming technique provides an operationaliza-
tion of self-enhancement that is both concrete and indepen-
dent of cognitive ability. The application of signal detection 
formulas provides a systematic and mathematically defen-
sible basis for separating the degree of accuracy from the de-
gree of self-report bias.7 The indexes can be scored on a stan-
dard set of knowledge items such as the OCQ-150. Although 
the accuracy and bias formulas are calculated independently, 
they may still be correlated across individuals. It is important, 
therefore, to partial out accuracy before the bias index is used 
to predict outcome variables. This caution is one of several el-
ements that increase our confidence in interpreting the OCQ 
bias index as over-claiming—a distinct operationalization of 
self-enhancement.
Convergent Validity
Our interpretation of the over-claiming index was supported 
here by four studies showing convergence with established 
measures of trait self-enhancement. These criteria included 
questionnaire measures of narcissism and self-deceptive en-
hancement. Because it is the best validated trait measure of 
self-enhancement, we used the NPI as our primary criterion. 
As expected, associations with the NPI were consistently pos-
itive and significant—even when the OCQ was completed un-
der anonymous conditions where there was no demand to ap-
Table 3. Study 4: Associations of Over-Claiming Questionnaire (OCQ) Bias Index With Four 
Measures of Adjustment
                                                                                         Criterion variable
                                                       Self-esteem     Ego-resiliency      Self-rated     Informant-rated
Predictor variable                             (RSE)                (ER-89)           adjustment      adjustment
OCQ bias  .30**  .25**  .21*  –.11
OCQ bias + NPI  .22*  .18*  .15*  .13
OCQ bias + NPI and SDE  .16*  .14*  .14*  .11
N = 157. All entries are beta regression coefficients. RSE = Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale; ER 
= Block’s Ego-Resiliency Scale; NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory; SDE = Self-Deceptive 
Enhancement scale.
* p < .05, one-tailed ; ** p < .01, one-tailed
7 One could argue that the rate of false alarms is the most convincing measure because the foils do not exist. We obtain similar results using the 
false-alarm rate, but the latter score is less reliable because it is based on one fifth of the responses. The criterion bias measure exploits all of the 
responses and is statistically more defensible in signal detection terms.
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pear positive (Study 3). This consistent link indicates that the 
tendency to over-claim is not an isolated questionnaire style: It 
results from a deeper and broader personality syndrome. The 
nature of that syndrome is clarified by our finding of a consis-
tent association with a measure of self-deceptive enhancement 
8 under standard administration conditions. With no audience 
other than the self, over-claiming is unlikely to be conscious 
dissimulation: Chronic over-claimers really believe their exag-
gerated claims of knowledge.
The validity of our over-claiming index as a measure of a 
trait-like tendency to self-enhance is further supported by 
its convergence with other relevant criteria. Study 1 showed 
that OCQ bias predicted the most concrete measure of self-en-
hancement in the current literature, namely, self-criterion dis-
crepancy (see Colvin et al., 1995; John & Robins, 1994). In that 
same study, fellow discussion group members reported that 
over-claimers tended to brag and otherwise behave in an ego-
tistical fashion.
Finally, the use of over-claiming rate as an indicator of state 
self-enhancement is supported by its responsiveness to situ-
ational demand for self-presentation. Study 2 showed that a 
warning about the presence of foils reduced over-claiming. 
Study 3 showed that, when asked to create a positive impres-
sion, respondents showed much higher levels of over-claim-
ing. Interestingly, in both conditions in both studies, narcis-
sists consistently showed the highest levels of over-claiming. 
Even within high-demand conditions, trait differences remain 
influential.
Discriminant Validity
As noted above, predictions with the OCQ bias measure are 
always assessed after controlling for the OCQ accuracy score. 
Thus, discriminant validity with respect to accurate knowledge 
is built into the calculation of the over-claiming index. Our re-
porting of regression coefficients instead of raw correlations 
was not arbitrary but a judicious decision based on our finding 
that the accuracy and bias indexes suppress one another. This 
replicable suppressor effect is worth noting in a literature that 
currently disparages claims for suppressor effects (see Trzesn-
iewski et al., 2003). In short, presentation of the raw correlations 
would provide misleading underestimates of the true relations 
of accuracy and bias with their respective criterion variables.
Our research also provides evidence about other aspects of 
discriminant validity. We worried that over-claiming might be 
confounded with traditional acquiescence variance: That is, the 
index might simply be catching those individuals who tend to 
use the high end of any rating scale they encounter (Knowles 
& Condon, 1999; Wiggins, 1973). We dealt with this possibil-
ity in our preliminary study (Paulhus & Bruce, 1990) by al-
ternating the direction of the various OCQ topics and exam-
ining the intercorrelations. No difference in correlations was 
observed between topics pointed in the same direction versus 
topics pointed in opposite directions. Evidence from the pres-
ent studies further supports that claim. The associations with 
the NPI (a forced-choice instrument) and discrepancy mea-
sures cannot be explained by interpreting over-claiming scores 
as acquiescent responding.
The IM scale (Paulhus, 1991) also failed to show any asso-
ciation with over-claiming under honest-response conditions. 
This finding supports the view that under low-demand con-
ditions, over-claiming has a self-deceptive rather than a con-
trolled origin. However, similar to the IM scale (Paulhus, 1984; 
Paulhus et al., 1995), over-claiming also tracks the degree of 
self-presentation across conditions differing in demand for 
self-presentation (see Study 3). The total over-claiming score, 
then, is a combination of state and trait effects.
Self-monitoring is another major contender for diagnosing 
self-enhancement (e.g., Graziano & Waschull, 1995; Snyder, 
1974). Our Study 1 revealed no significant association between 
over-claiming and Self-Monitoring Scale scores. Apparently, 
high self-monitors do not show the narcissists’ tendency to 
over-claim under honest response conditions. Although they 
may devote attention to adjusting their impressions on others, 
we found no evidence that self-monitors show any narcissistic 
bias in self-analysis.
At the same time, this differentiation from self-monitor-
ing may be taken as further evidence that over-claiming is not 
simply a conscious form of self-presentation designed to im-
press an audience. Unlike high self-monitors, who have to be 
attuned to social reality, narcissistic self-enhancers have an ex-
aggeratedly positive self-evaluation (Paulhus, in press).
Practical Advantages
Because of several valuable features, the over-claiming index 
scored from the OCQ shows promise as an unobtrusive mea-
sure of self-enhancement. It can be used with or without warn-
ing respondents about the foils.9 It can be used in situations 
with high or low demand for self-presentation. The format is 
straightforward and relatively nonthreatening. There is no time 
pressure. In short, the over-claiming approach reduces defen-
siveness relative to traditional measures of self-enhancement.
The over-claiming technique can be particularly valuable 
in a context where measurement of cognitive ability is also 
needed. In another report (Paulhus & Harms, in press), we de-
tailed four studies supporting the ability of the OCQ accuracy 
index to predict standard intelligence measures. This second-
ary feature has motivated our current plans to test the efficacy 
of the OCQ in practical situations such as educational assess-
ment, personnel selection, and clinical diagnosis.
The complexities of calculating signal detection indexes can 
also be avoided by an alternative scoring procedure. One can 
use the false-alarm rate as the index of over-claiming if the hit 
rate is partialed out. For example, the raw correlation between 
false-alarm rate and self-esteem in Study 4 is .17 but improves 
to .26 when hit rate is partialed out. This approach also pro-
vides a conceptual advantage in that false-alarm rate is a more 
intuitively compelling operationalization of over-claiming.10
Theoretical Interpretations of Over-Claiming
There are limitations incurred by our operationalization of 
self-enhancement as over-claiming. First is the fact that self-
enhancement is measured only in the knowledge domain. Sec-
ond is the potential confusion created by the fact that accuracy 
8 This measure has already been shown to overlap conceptually and empirically with the NPI (Paulhus, 1998).
9 Note that the validity is contaminated if some but not all respondents are warned about the foils.
10 For those who wish to score the signal detection indexes, the SPSS syntax is available from Delroy L. Paulhus.
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and bias are typically assumed to be mutually exclusive: In sig-
nal detection, they are independent. Therefore, one can be both 
accurate and biased. For example, an individual with accurate 
knowledge of literary authors may still over-claim by assum-
ing that he or she recognizes even vaguely familiar foils. The 
apparent paradox created by independent accuracy and bias 
indexes might be more palatable to some readers if the indexes 
were relabeled knowledge and confidence, respectively. Unfortu-
nately, the term overconfidence is precluded because it is prom-
inent in the decision-making literature where it has been oper-
ationalized rather differently (e.g., Stankov & Crawford, 1996).
Agentic Versus Communal Self-Enhancement
People can self-enhance with regard to a variety of dimen-
sions. Rather than being infinite in number, the dimensions 
have been shown to converge into two factors variously dis-
tinguished as egotism versus morality or agency versus com-
munion, among other labels (Campbell et al., 2002; Paulhus 
& John, 1998; Raskin et al., 1991). The evidence provided in 
the present studies suggests that over-claiming is agentic in 
nature.
Support for this proposition emerges first in Study 1, where 
over-claiming correlated with discrepancy self-enhancement 
only on intelligence, Extraversion, and Openness, the most 
agentic traits. Over-claiming also correlated most clearly with 
questionnaire measures of bias known to be associated with 
agency, namely, self-deceptive enhancement and narcissism. 
By contrast, over-claiming showed no association with Im-
pression Management, Self-Deceptive Denial, or self-moni-
toring scales. Hence, it is distinct from the communal, moral-
istic form of self-favoring bias tapped by the latter measures 
11 (Paulhus & John, 1998; Wiggins, 1991). Although both SDE 
and NPI tap agentic bias, the NPI also shows a slight negative 
correlation with communal bias. The OCQ bias index seems to 
avoid the disagreeable aspect of self-enhancement inherent in 
narcissism (Leary, Bednarski, Hammon, & Duncan, 1997; Rho-
dewalt & Morf, 1995).
Questionnaire Item Correlates
To help clarify the nature of over-claiming, we identified its 
best item correlates of OCQ bias in ancillary analyses of the 
Study 4 data. On the SDE scale, the best item correlates were 
“I am very confident in my judgments” and “I never regret my 
decisions.” Noting that SDE gives credit only for extreme re-
sponses, these items suggest that over-claiming is associated 
with over-confidence and complete lack of regret. Among NPI 
items, the top correlates of OCQ bias were “I find it easy to 
influence others,” “I like to be the center of attention,” and “I 
am an extraordinary person.” These differ in kind from the 
SDE item correlates and, indeed, from each other: All three de-
rive from different factors of the NPI (Emmons, 1987). Least 
represented in these items is the most interpersonally aver-
sive factor, Exploitation-Entitlement (Emmons, 1987; Watson 
& Morris, 1991). Together, these results suggest that our over-
claiming index, like self-deceptive enhancement, avoids the 
disagreeable element inherent in narcissism.
Could a questionnaire self-report version of over-claiming 
be developed? As questionnaires, neither the SDE nor the NPI 
directly address intellectual overconfidence, the form most di-
rectly linked to over-claiming knowledge across a variety of 
domains. We suspect that the optimal questionnaire items 
would sound something like “I’m the smartest person I know” 
or “No one thinks as clearly as I do.” Recall from our introduc-
tion, however, that previous self-report measures have long 
been available and have equally long been criticized. Hence, 
we are skeptical that such a quest would be fruitful.
Over-Claiming Versus Discrepancy Measures of Self-Enhancement
We argued in the introduction that the “gold standard” mea-
sure of self-enhancement was the self-criterion discrepancy 
measure (e.g., John & Robins, 1994). Using NPI scores as a cri-
terion, the OCQ bias index performed at a comparable level 
to the discrepancy measures. Given the practical advantages 
noted above—ease of administration, in particular—a case can 
be made for over-claiming as the method of choice.
Discrepancy measures are conceptually persuasive in that 
they index degree of departure from reality (scored in the de-
sirable direction). Is over-claiming as conceptually persua-
sive? Operationally, a high over-claiming score represents a 
low threshold for claiming recognition of general knowledge 
items. Presumably, the low threshold derives from an exagger-
ated sense of familiarity. The fact that even narcissists raised 
their threshold in Study 2 and lowered it in Study 3 indicates 
some degree of control (see Krueger, 1998). However, through 
it all, narcissists continued to over-claim more than did non-
narcissists. The resiliency of this association convinces us that 
knowledge over-claiming taps self-enhancement—if only the 
agentic form—and that its nature is primarily self-deceptive.
Future Research
Other projects in our laboratory involve broadening the search 
for self-enhancing personalities. Besides narcissists and self-
monitors, other likely candidates are Machiavellians and psy-
chopaths.12 Some writers argue that narcissists, Machiavellians, 
and psychopaths are equivalent personalities when measured in 
the normal range (McHoskey, Worzel, & Szyarto, 1998). So far, 
our evidence suggests that subclinical psychopaths also show 
elevated levels of OCQ bias—less so than narcissists but more 
so than Machiavellians (Paulhus & Williams, 2002).
Future research is required to clarify the nature of the self-
enhancement captured by the OCQ over-claiming index. Is it 
identical to narcissism? Is it a cognitive form of narcissism? 
Metcalfe (1998) has argued that such self-enhancement biases 
are purely a function of memory organization. In contrast, 
Morf and Rhodewalt (2001) argued for a more motivational 
perspective. From a third perspective, some have argued that 
self-enhancement is a controllable bias, not a cognitive illusion 
(Krueger, 1998; Sedikides et al., 2002). Application of the over-
claiming questionnaire may aid in sorting out these oppos-
ing positions. Preliminary evidence from our laboratory sug-
gests that OCQ bias scores are partly determined by a general 
memory bias that is independent of narcissism (Paulhus, Wil-
liams, & Nathanson, 2002). Therefore, the memory bias com-
ponent adds noise to our measurement of over-claiming as 
self-enhancement.
11 Under honest response conditions, IM taps an identity as a good, moral person (Paulhus, 2002). This view is consistent with the view that im-
pression management is more than just manipulative faking (Hogan & Nicholson, 1988; Schlenker & Weigold, 1989).
12 With a newly available measure (Paulhus, Hemphill, & Hare, in press), noncriminal psychopathy can now be studied.
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A key issue in understanding over-claiming is the psycho-
logical mechanism behind the claiming of nonexistent foils. 
As frequent constructors of multiple-choice tests, academ-
ics know that good foils, also known as lures, are designed to 
snag respondents whose knowledge of a topic is only partial. 
Similarly, some of our foils (e.g., “cholarine”) may draw the 
respondents who have heard of a similar-sounding term (e.g., 
chlorine) but not draw respondents who have never heard of 
this term. Indeed, some respondents may believe the item to 
be a typographical error. Of course, foils were retained be-
cause they “worked”: That is, they helped differentiate nar-
cissists from non-narcissists. However, we do not yet know 
whether interpretation of items as typos interacts with the re-
spondent’s narcissism in determining the tendency to endorse 
the item. Hampering solutions to these questions is the fact 
that systematic item-selection procedures have yet to be devel-
oped for SDA-based measures.
One approach likely to prove fruitful in clarifying over-
claiming is the investigation of situational moderators. For ex-
ample, ego threat may increase over-claiming as it does other 
forms of self-enhancement (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Morf 
& Rhodewalt, 2001). Our administrations can hardly be char-
acterized as ego threatening, yet we found substantial over-
claiming even in our least threatening condition—the anon-
ymous classroom administration in Study 3. If the ego-threat 
hypothesis is correct, our studies may have provided only a 
conservative estimate of over-claiming rates. Another poten-
tial situational moderator is time pressure (e.g., Holden et al., 
2001; Stricker & Alderton, 1999).
Finally, our understanding of the type of self-enhancement 
indexed by over-claiming would benefit from studying associ-
ations with individual-difference measures of a similar nature: 
These include various subscales of the NPI (e.g., Emmons, 
1987; Raskin & Terry, 1988), alternative measures of self-en-
hancement (Holden & Fekken, 1993; Krueger, 1998), differ-
ential factors of knowledge (Rolfhus & Ackerman, 1996), and 
overconfidence indexes (Stankov & Crawford, 1996).13 Of par-
ticular interest is why overconfidence indexes have failed to 
show personality correlates (Wright & Phillips, 1979), whereas 
our over-claiming indexes show such coherent and robust per-
sonality correlates.
Conclusions
Attempts to measure self-enhancement have always been 
hotly contested. Such concern is appropriate because of the 
critical importance of self-enhancement to fundamental psy-
chological questions. Can we believe what people tell us? Is 
it a good thing or a bad thing to lie to oneself? It has become 
clear that neither of these questions has a simple answer. The 
research presented here does support our optimism that the 
over-claiming approach can help cut through some of the cur-
rent obstacles to resolving these fundamental issues.
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Appendix
Format of the Over-Claiming Questionnaire (OCQ)
Using the following scale as a guideline, write a number from 0 to 6 beside each item to indicate how familiar you are with it 
Never heard of it  Very familiar
0  1  2  3  4  5  6
Physical Sciences
______ Manhattan Project  ______ asteroid  ______ nuclear fusion
______ cholarine  ______ atomic number  ______ hydroponics
______ alloy  ______ plate tectonics  ______ photon
______ ultra-lipid  ______ centripetal force  ______ plates of parallax
______ nebula  ______ particle accelerator  ______ satellite
Note. Of the 15 items above, the following 3 are foils: cholarine, ultra-lipid, and plates of parallax. Other topic categories in-
clude literature, art, history, social science, language, contemporary culture, and consumer products.
